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INTRODUCTION 
 
As an emerging-market economy, the South African experience with 
inflation from the perspective of the central bank over an extended period 
provides an interesting insight into monetary policy successes and 
failures for similar economies. A reflection on the South African 
experience shows clearly that policy approaches should be discarded and 
replaced by more suitable policy frameworks whenever circumstances 
change. 
 
Reliable inflation data for South Africa are published as far back as 
19213, thereby coinciding with the establishment of the SA Reserve Bank 
(the Bank), although rudimentary data on price levels are available from 
well before 1921. South Africa’s problems with accelerating inflation 
since the 1970s are well documented (see for instance De Kock, 1981; De 
Kock, 1984; Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1985; Rupert, 1974a; Rupert, 
1974b; or Stals, 1989). This paper shows that South Africa also suffered 
earlier periods of inflation (e.g. during and after World War II), while 
various parts (or regions) of what constitutes today the Republic of South 
Africa have experienced problems with inflation, rising prices or currency 
depreciation well before 1921. The first example of early inflation in 
South Africa was caused by currency depreciation. At the time of the 
second British annexation of the Cape in 1806, the Dutch riksdaalder 
(‘riksdollar’) served as the major local currency in circulation. During the 
tenure of the Duke of Caledon, Governor of the Cape Colony from 1807 
to 1811, and the Duke of Cradock, Governor from 1811 to 1814, 
riksdollar notes in circulation were increased by nearly 50 per cent 
(Engelbrecht, 1987: 29). As could be expected under circumstances of 
increasing currency in circulation, the value of the riksdollar in 
comparison to the UK pound sterling and in terms of its purchasing 
power declined from 4 shillings in 1806 to 1 shilling and 5½ pennies in 
1825 (or 1/6, according to Die Huisgenoot, 1938: 43), a decline in value 
of 4,86 per cent per annum, with a concomitant increase in the prices of 
consumer goods (Engelbrecht, 1987: 29).  
 
As is the case during most periods of sustained currency depreciation or 
inflation, this period also produced ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Local officials 
whose salaries were paid in riksdollars suffered hardship, while senior 
officials whose salaries were paid in UK pound sterling were protected 
against the depreciation in the value of the currency and the concomitant 
increase in the prices of consumer goods (Engelbrecht, 1987: 29). 
Domestic producers were in the same position as local officials earning 
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riksdollars. The problem of the riksdollar’s declining value led to its 
gradual withdrawal from circulation from 1827, with the final withdrawal 
in 1841, when UK pound sterling became the only legal tender in the 
Cape Colony (Engelbrecht, 1987: 33). 
 
Secondly, domestic spending financed by bank credit during World War I 
resulted in domestic price increases in South Africa (De Kock, 1954: 9). 
De Kock (1954: 9) mentions that the index of retail prices covering food, 
fuel, light, rent and sundries increased at an average rate of nearly 15 per 
cent per annum in the period 1914 to 1920. 
 
This paper commences with a discussion of the establishment of the Bank 
in Section 2. Sections 3 to 13 consider various phases since 1921 and the 
Bank’s policy successes and failures in containing inflation. Section 14 
highlights initiatives of the Bank aimed at improving communication 
since the adoption of an inflation target in 2000. The conclusions follow 
in Section 15. 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANK 
 
The first bank established in South Africa was the Lombaard Bank in 
Cape Town, which opened its doors for business on 23 April 1793 
(Arndt, 1928: 191). Although this bank was fully-owned by the Cape 
Colonial Government, it was established with commercial activities in 
mind (Arndt, 1928: 191), and was not envisaged to function in any way 
as a central bank. This bank was closed in 1842, inter alia, as it did not 
meet the banking requirements of the Cape Colony at the time. 
 
The earliest proposals for the establishment of a central bank in South 
Africa were made as far back as 1879 by the Afrikaner Bond, a political 
party in the then Cape Colony (D’Assonville, 1999: 203; De Kock, 1954: 
3; SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 9). Following on the proposals of the 
Afrikaner Bond, a banking and financial crisis in the then Cape Colony in 
1890 and 1891 once again gave rise to calls for the establishment of a 
central bank (SA Reserve Bank, [S.a.]: 1). A newspaper in the Cape 
Colony, De Paarl, published at the time a series of articles on the 
advisability of the establishment of a central bank (SA Reserve Bank, 
[S.a.]: 1), presumably for the then Cape Colony. These articles might be 
related to the earlier calls of the Afrikaner Bond, in as much as its 
founding leader, the Reverend Dr S J du Toit, was editor of the 
newspaper from 1890 to 1896 (D’Assonville, 1999: 125). In this series of 
articles, the advantages of a central bank were explained, inter alia, as 
stability in the circulation of banknotes, interest rate stability, 
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encouragement of trade, and serving the best interests of the government 
and the public in times of crisis (SA Reserve Bank, [S.a.]: 1). A draft 
charter for a domestic central bank was also published. 
 
In 1911 the advantages of a central bank was again advocated by Mr M 
Groslaude, who proposed the establishment of such a bank for the newly 
formed Union of South Africa (SA Reserve Bank, [S.a.]: 1). The matter 
was also raised in 1912 by Mr J Postmus (SA Reserve Bank, [S.a.]: 1), at 
the time an Inspector of the Netherlands Bank of South Africa. It is 
noteworthy that Mr Postmus was appointed as Deputy Governor of the 
Bank on 1 January 1927, and with effect from 1 January 1932 as the 
Bank’s second Governor (Meiring, 1994: 163). 
 
In the absence of a central bank (i.e. before 1921 in South Africa), 
commercial banks printed banknotes for issue (see for instance SA 
Reserve Bank, [S.a.]: 1). Such notes were backed fully by gold in terms 
of a gold standard, i.e. the notes could be converted into gold at a fixed 
conversion rate. At the time of the establishment of the Bank, the power 
of commercial banks to issue banknotes was internationally a long-
established practice, albeit under ‘review’, as banks of issue (as central 
banks were initially known) were established in various countries, 
particularly in Europe, in the nineteenth century (SA Reserve Bank, 
[S.a.]: 1). 
 
During the Great War (as World War I was initially known) the South 
African currency remained on a gold standard and commercial banks 
were obliged to redeem their notes for gold (De Kock, 1954: 11). In terms 
of this arrangement the domestic currency was pegged to the British 
currency (UK pound sterling), which in turn was pegged to the US dollar 
and, therefore, the gold price, in each instance at a fixed rate of 
conversion. This arrangement ended in March 1919 when the peg of UK 
pound sterling to the US dollar was suspended, with pound sterling 
depreciating against the US dollar and gold (Gelb, 1989: 54). As a result, 
gold obtained in South Africa through the conversion of banknotes at 
commercial banks could be sold at a premium in London (SA Reserve 
Bank, 1971: 10). At the same time, domestic commercial banks had to 
buy gold at the same premium in London to provide the necessary 
backing for their banknotes in issue in terms of the gold standard applied 
in South Africa. In reaction to the call on government by the commercial 
banks to be released of this obligation to ‘trade at a loss’, a Gold 
Conference was convened in Pretoria in October 1919 (De Kock, 1954: 
11). 
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One of the resolutions of the Gold Conference was to request government 
to introduce one uniform Bank Act for the country (De Kock, 1954: 13), 
as no such legislation had been introduced since the unification of the 
country in 1910. Following on this proposal, the Government engaged the 
services of Mr H Strakosch (later Sir Henry), a British banker, who was 
instrumental in a proposal that a domestic central bank should be 
established (De Kock, 1954: 14; see also Gelb, 1989: 48). This 
culminated in the Currency and Banking Act, No 31 of 1920, which 
provided, inter alia, for the establishment of a central bank with the power 
to issue domestic banknotes (De Kock, 1954: 23; Engelbrecht, 1987: 95 
and 96; Mboweni, 2000: 1; SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 11 and 12). The 
Bank opened on 30 June 1921 (SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 12) and issued 
its first banknotes to the public on 19 April 1922 (SA Reserve Bank, 
1971: 22). Commercial banks were subsequently instructed to cease 
issuing or re-issuing their own banknotes with effect from 30 June 1922. 
 
Opposition was voiced to the establishment of a central bank at the time, 
in as far as ‘[a] fairly prevalent view seems to have been that because of 
the highly centralised nature of South African banking at the time, a 
central bank would serve no useful purpose’ (SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 
12). It is of interest to note that Mr H C Jorrison, at the time the General 
Manager of the Netherlands Bank of South Africa, held the view that it 
was not an opportune time to establish a central bank (De Kock, 1954: 
13), but nevertheless accepted an appointment as the first Deputy 
Governor of the Reserve Bank in January 1921 (Meiring, 1994: 125). 
Similarly, Mr J P Gibson was strongly opposed to the establishment of a 
central bank, but nevertheless accepted a position as an elected non-
executive member of the Board of the Bank upon its establishment 
(Meiring, 1994: 94). 
 
The name chosen for the central bank of South Africa, the SA Reserve 
Bank, reflects reference to the Federal Reserve System in the United 
States of America (US). De Kock states that ‘[t]he features which the 
South African Reserve Bank had in common with the Federal Reserve 
Banks at that time were … [inter alia]… [t]he designation of Reserve 
Bank, which had previously been adopted only in the United States …’ 
(1954: 38). Subsequently, the word Reserve has been used in the names 
of the central banks of Peru (albeit in Spanish, Reserva), established in 
1922; New Zealand, established in 1933; El Salvador (albeit in Spanish, 
Reserva), established in 1934; India (1935); Australia (1945); Malawi 
(1964); Zimbabwe (originally the central bank of Rhodesia) (1964); Fiji 
(1973); Vanuatu (1980); and Tonga (1989).  
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By 1921 the majority of central banks had private shareholders (or 
stockholders as they were called at the time), and the same approach was 
adopted for the Bank. Internationally governments started nationalising 
central banks in the 1930s and 1940s (De Kock, 1956: 312), but the 
ownership structure of the South African Reserve Bank has not been 
changed. It is still a juristic person in terms of its own Act, which 
provides for private shareholders. Currently only nine central banks have 
shareholders other than their respective governments, i.e. Austria, 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, Switzerland and 
the US (Lybek and Morris, 2004: 7). 
 
Since its inception, the following people served as governors of the 
Reserve Bank (see for instance Meiring, 1994, or Stals, 1996): 
• Mr W H Clegg, 17 December 1920 to 31 December 1931; 
• Mr (later Dr) J Postmus, 1 January 1932 to 30 June 1945; 
• Dr M H de Kock, 1 July 1945 to 30 June 1962; 
• Mr (later Dr) G Rissik, 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1967; 
• Dr T W de Jongh, 1 July 1967 to 31 December 1980; 
• Dr G P C de Kock, 1 January 1981 to 7 August 1989 (the only person 
to die whilst still serving as Governor); 
• Dr C L Stals, 8 August 1989 to 7 August 1999; and 
• Mr T T Mboweni, since 8 August 1999.  
  
Over the period 1921 to 2007 average prices, as reflected by changes in 
the CPI, increased considerably in South Africa. In terms of an index with 
1922 = 100, the index value for 2007 is 9 728,4, representing an average 
increase of some 5,5 per cent per annum. Put differently, the implication 
is that the purchasing power of R1,00 in 1922 was only some 1,1 cents in 
2007. At the same time, the price of an average basket of goods and 
services that sold for the equivalent of R1,00 in 1922, was about R97,28 
in 2007. 
 
GOLD STANDARD: 1921 TO 19324 
 
The initial policy aim of the Bank was to ensure South Africa’s return to 
a gold standard, as the non-convertibility of the currency in the true sense 
of the word (into gold specie or coin) was seen as a temporary 
arrangement. The country was nominally on a gold standard, but the 
system was effectively suspended. The Bank could, on behalf of 
Government, issue gold certificates in exchange for gold and banknotes, 
but declare the certificates non-convertible (SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 26).  
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South Africa reintroduced the gold standard at the pre-war conversion 
rate on 18 May 1925. This put the South African pound on par value with 
the UK pound sterling, as the United Kingdom (UK) returned to a gold 
standard on 25 April 1925, also at the pre-war conversion rate to the US 
currency (Sloman, 1994: 607). Sloman (1994: 607) is highly critical of 
the decision of the UK to restore the gold standard at the previous 
conversion rate, as its adoption required the introduction of deflationary 
policies in the UK. Similar conditions applied to South Africa. The use of 
a gold standard domestically and internationally was underscored at the 
time by ‘… the general belief and conviction … that exchange rate 
stability was of paramount importance for the maintenance of 
international confidence and the conduct of international trade …’ (De 
Kock, 1956: 123). 
 
The UK suspended the gold standard on 21 September 1931 (De Kock, 
1956: 142) in the midst of the Great Depression (see for instance Parkin, 
2003: 722 for background on the Depression). South Africa had to 
consider whether it should retain or abandon its own gold standard. The 
three alternatives available to South Africa were to (i) retain the gold 
standard independently from the UK; (ii) depreciate the domestic 
currency and link it to a higher gold price (i.e. a revision of the 
conversion rate underpinning the gold standard); or (iii) peg the domestic 
currency to the UK pound sterling, rather than to gold. 
 
The South African authorities elected the first option and retained 
convertibility of banknotes for gold and the free export and import of 
gold. This resulted in an immediate speculative capital outflow from 
South Africa. The Bank had to sell most of its foreign currency holdings 
in order to meet the demand for gold, causing a loss of some £ 1,5 million 
for the Bank. This loss exceeded the Bank’s reserves built up over the 
preceding 10 years by some £ 400 000, which had to be written down 
against its capital fund of £ 1 million. The prescription at the time that the 
Bank had to publish a weekly statement of assets and liabilities, rather 
than a monthly statement as is currently the case, implied that the extent 
of growing losses were released publicly on a weekly basis. Maintaining 
the gold standard not only exacerbated the consequences of the 
depression, but mounting losses of the Bank also raised questions about 
its continued financial viability. These concerns forced the Minister of 
Finance towards the end of October 1931 to confirm in a statement that 
government would guarantee the Bank’s solvability and liquidity. In a 
present-day environment of operational autonomy for central banks, the 
issuance of a statement of this nature will place such autonomy in serious 
jeopardy. If a central bank cannot ensure its own financial viability, it can 
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hardly be argued that it should be afforded the autonomy to conduct its 
operations without interference from the government, for whose account 
those operations will be. Under such conditions the government will 
rightly have the authority to insist on steps to limit its potential financial 
exposure, emanating from the central bank operations. 
 
All sectors of the economy other than gold mining (gold exports realised 
a higher international price than before) suffered severe hardship owing 
to declines in international demand and the appreciation of the domestic 
currency, relative to the value of UK pound sterling, the currency of 
South Africa’s major trading partner country. In addition, South African 
agriculture also suffered the consequences of a drought in 1932, while 
‘[t]he farming community … [was also] ... increasingly burdened by the 
rising real value of debt entered into during the more prosperous 
“twenties”’ (SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 36) in an environment of declining 
prices. 
 
The gold standard controversy duly developed into a political tussle, with 
government supporting it and the Parliamentary opposition favouring its 
abolition (SA Reserve Bank: 1971: 34). The economic hardship resulted 
in dwindling support for the government’s economic policy until the 
matter came to a conclusion on 21 December 1932, when a viable 
political alternative in the form of a coalition opposition party aiming at 
the abolition of the gold standard was announced. Owing to an 
expectation that the new political party could unseat the government and 
therefore change the policy on the gold standard, renewed demand for 
gold emerged. This forced government to abolish the convertibility of 
banknotes into gold from 28 December 1932 (SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 
37). Inconvertibility was seen as a temporary emergency measure, 
evidenced by the fact that South African banknotes carried a nominal 
promise of convertibility until 1992 (Van Rensburg, 2003: 295). 
 
Looking back after more than 70 years on the final abolition of the gold 
standard, the speed at which developments took place is somewhat 
surprising. Within seven days after the announcement on 21 December 
1932, the gold standard was abolished. This period included Christmas 
and Boxing Day (currently 26 December is known as the Day of 
Goodwill public holiday in South Africa), which were at the time also 
two public holidays in South Africa. It seems fair to conclude that the 
central bank and Government must have had some prior contingency 
planning in place which could simply be implemented after 21 December 
1921. This makes the lack of clear policy direction after the abolition of 
the gold standard, explained in the next section, even less understandable.  
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As is evident in tables A1 and B1 in Appendices A and B, South Africa 
experienced deflation from 1921 to 1932, with prices declining on 
average by some 3,3 per cent per annum, but with a very sharp decline of 
4,5 per cent in 1932. Low inflation or relative price stability were not 
achieved, but rather moderate deflation – which was the objective of the 
policy, i.e. to restore price levels to those prevailing before the Great 
War. The prime overdraft rate of commercial banks fluctuated around 7 
per cent (Republic of South Africa, 1985: 106), while the margin between 
Bank rate (the rediscount rate for commercial banks at the Bank at the 
time) and the minimum overdraft rate of commercial banks ranged from 
0,75 to 1,6 per cent (Republic of South Africa, 1985: 106). As the rate of 
inflation declined on average by some 3,3 per cent per annum, it implies 
that the real average minimum overdraft rate was slightly above 10 per 
cent per annum. If 1932 is considered in isolation, the real minimum 
lending rate of commercial banks was 11,8 per cent, which aggravated the 
difficulties caused by the Great Depression and the maintenance of the 
gold standard.  
 
AFTER THE GOLD STANDARD: 1933 TO 19385 
 
Owing to the abolition of the gold standard it was necessary to consider 
an alternative monetary policy approach for South Africa. It was decided 
by the monetary authorities6 ‘… to leave the future monetary policy of 
the country to be determined by Parliament …’ (De Kock, 1954: 191), 
due to reconvene early in 1933. Today such a decision would certainly be 
viewed as abandoning responsibility for policy formulation and 
implementation by the relevant authorities. Parliament passed in March 
1933 the Currency and Exchanges Act, No 9 of 1933, which linked the 
value of the domestic currency to that of UK pound sterling.  
 
South Africa’s domestic economic conditions and international economic 
relations at the time shows that ‘… the abandonment of the gold standard 
and the depreciation of the South African pound to the level of sterling 
were decidedly beneficial to the Union’ (De Kock, 1954: 212). The 
improvement in general economic conditions gave rise to the question 
whether the Bank would be able to control inflation successfully, as ‘… 
commercial banks … no longer had to avail themselves of the credit 
facilities of the Reserve Bank. Had the Bank deemed it necessary to raise 
its discount rate in order to restrict credit, it would … have experienced 
great difficulty in making the higher rate effective’ (De Kock: 1954: 233). 
De Kock (1956: 123) states that the Bank and central banks 
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internationally increased their focus on the control of credit to stabilise 
the price level after the abolition of the gold standard7. 
 
Prices increased on average by 0,6 per cent per annum between 1933 and 
1938. The average minimum overdraft rate of commercial banks was 
about 5,5 per cent, with a constant margin of 2 percentage points between 
this rate and Bank rate maintained for a period of 10 years from 1935 
(Republic of South Africa, 1985: 106). The average real minimum 
lending rate was therefore about 4,9 per cent. Despite the Bank’s 
problems with restricting credit, it achieved the maintenance of relative 
price stability. 
 
WORLD WAR II: 1939 TO 19458 
 
At the outbreak of World War II, South Africa retained its membership of 
the Sterling Area, established in 1933 after the abolition of the gold 
standard. Exchange control measures imposed in terms of the Sterling 
Area agreement permitted free international payments between member 
countries, but payments to countries outside the Area required permission 
from the exchange control authorities. This arrangement, i.e. the first 
introduction of a form of exchange control in South Africa, forms the 
foundation of the country’s current system of exchange control.  
 
The South African authorities supplemented monetary policy with an 
extensive system of direct control measures to curb inflationary pressures 
during the War. Under these circumstances the inflation suffered by 
South Africa at the time is described by De Kock as ‘… the suppressed 
rather than the open variety … [which] … brought with it the 
disadvantages of the former rather than the latter’ (1954: 268). Inflation 
as measured in terms of actual price increases, rather than as measured in 
terms of shortages during the period of control, increased substantially in 
the period after the relaxation of the control measures. 
 
The South African experience with direct controls during and after World 
War II was subsequently also suffered by other countries. An example is 
the US, where the government introduced an incomes policy on 15 
August 1971 and maintained controls until 30 April 1974 (Kosters, 1977: 
121). Consumer price inflation accelerated to a level of 12,2 per cent in 
the eight months after 30 April 1974 (Kosters, 1977: 122). As often 
happens during a period of direct controls interfering with the functioning 
of the market mechanism of supply and demand, shortages were also 
reported in the US (Kosters, 1977: 188). This brings to mind Goodhart’s 
law, which states that ‘[c]ontrolling a symptom of a problem or only one 
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part of the problem will not cure the problem: it will simply mean that the 
part that is being controlled now becomes a poor indicator of the 
problem’ (Sloman, 1994: 753). The implication is obvious: as is the case 
with sound monetary policy following on a period of persistent high 
inflation, an incomes policy is also not a painless solution to solve an 
inflation problem. In this case the cost is reflected in shortages during the 
period of control, rather than in increases in interest rates, and subsequent 
price increases after the abolition of control.  
 
The Bank’s enabling legislation, the Currency and Banking Act, No 31 of 
1920, as amended, was replaced by the SA Reserve Bank Act, No 29 of 
1944, which consolidated matters pertaining to the Bank. At the time the 
National Party (which was in power in 1931/2 and supported the 
maintenance of the gold standard) was in opposition in Parliament and 
advocated extensive direct government control of the Bank. This view 
was not supported by the Parliamentary majority and the Bank’s 
autonomy was retained in the Act of 1944.  
 
Inflation was at an average annual rate of about 4,1 per cent, but price 
increases were suppressed by control measures, implying that the rate of 
inflation cannot be used as a true reflection of inflationary conditions in 
the economy. However, it seems that the authorities were generally not 
successful in achieving the overarching objective of relative price 
stability. 
 
THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PERIOD: 1946 TO 19549 
 
The domestic economy was generally sound at the end of World War II, 
but South Africa experienced some consequences of inflationary 
pressures emanating from control measures adopted during the War. At 
the time monetary policy was based on two conventional premises, i.e. 
money ‘… was a unique financial asset which played a strategic role in 
the determination of the total demand for goods and services. And the 
second was that the SA Reserve Bank and the commercial banks … were 
the only financial institutions which could create money … [while] … 
bank credit and money exerted an important influence on … prices and 
the balance of payments, and needed to be controlled in the interests of 
general economic stability and … to maintain stable exchange rates under 
the Bretton Woods system’ (Republic of South Africa, 1985: 144) of 
fixed but adjustable exchange rates, introduced after World War II. This 
system eventually collapsed in 1971 when the US suspended the 
convertibility of the US dollar into gold (see for instance Braithwaite and 
Drahos, 2000; or McAleese, 2004: 5). 
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A significant step in the development of South Africa’s financial structure 
occurred in 1949, with the establishment of the National Finance 
Corporation (NFC), which commenced operations on 20 September 1949 
(Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1985: 113; see also De Kock, 1956: 171). 
The purpose of establishing the NFC was to develop a domestic money 
market and to ensure optimal capital utilisation in South Africa. Its 
liquidity was guaranteed in terms of an agreement that the Bank will 
discount its Treasury bills as and when required, at the rates at which the 
NFC acquired the bills. This implied that the Bank performed a ‘… 
function of lender of last resort, being called upon to grant 
accommodation to the Government and the commercial banks only after 
all the other sources have been exhausted through the medium of the 
National Finance Corporation’ (De Kock, 1956: 171).  
 
According to De Kock (1956: 98) the function of lender of last resort 
flows from the central bank’s function as bank of rediscount. It is defined 
as ‘… the assumption of the responsibility of meeting, directly or 
indirectly, all reasonable demands for accommodation from commercial 
banks, discount houses and other credit institutions, subject to certain 
terms and conditions which constitute the discount rate policy of the 
central bank’ (De Kock, 1956: 98). Judged against the backdrop of 
current central banking refinancing activities within a classical system of 
cash reserve requirements for commercial banks, this description of the 
lender-of-last-resort function entails normal central banking discounting 
to banks. The meaning of lender of last resort has seemingly changed 
over time, and has recently been described by Mishkin as a system of 
providing ‘… reserves to banks when no one else would, thereby 
preventing bank and financial panics’ (2004: 402). This happened in 
South Africa as early as early as 1921, when the Bank provided special 
assistance to the National Bank (SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 23). 
 
It seems that a clarification of the meaning of lender-of-last-resort 
assistance is necessary. Different meanings are attached to these words in 
different jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions describe such lending as the 
refinancing by the central bank of temporary liquidity requirements of the 
banking system. In certain other jurisdictions these words refer to 
emergency central bank assistance to banks in distress. Clarification of 
terminology is important for the sound functioning of financial systems. 
It seems that emergency liquidity assistance might be a more appropriate 
description of this responsibility of central banks. 
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Inflation averaged 4,4 per cent per annum, implying that the average real 
minimum lending rate was about 1 per cent, depending on the specific 
year in the period considered. As was pointed out by the Governor at the 
time (SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 56), monetary policy was generally less 
than successful in supporting relative price stability, and higher real 
interest rates were perhaps necessary. 
 
THE LATE FIFTIES: 1955 TO 196010 
 
As was the case in many other countries in the late fifties, South Africa 
also implemented Keynesian policies aimed at stabilising economic 
activity. In South Africa’s case ‘… the official approach … was, in effect, 
a form of conservative Keynesianism which contained important 
elements of what later came to be known as monetarism. This was 
evident, for example, from the important role assigned to the money 
supply’ (Republic of South Africa, 1985: 144). Despite the importance 
attached to changes in the money supply and its influence on investment 
and spending, ‘… no thought was given during this phase to setting either 
published or unpublished targets for M1, M2, cash base or any other 
monetary aggregate’ (Republic of South Africa, 1985: 144). South Africa 
was part of the world-wide Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates and the Sterling Area. Against this backdrop the Bank 
considered all available economic data in its decision, but exchange rate 
stability enjoyed a high priority among the goals set for monetary policy. 
 
From 1946 the minimum overdraft rates of commercial banks were set at 
a margin of 1,5 percentage points above Bank rate, in terms of an 
agreement between the Bank and the commercial banks. This margin was 
changed to 2 percentage points in March 1958. Maintaining this margin 
enabled the Bank to exert a direct influence over the rates charged by 
commercial banks. Bank rate moved between 4 per cent and 4,5 per cent, 
with the average minimum overdraft rate at 6 per cent for this period. 
Inflation was at an average annual rate of about 2,3 per cent, implying 
that the average real minimum lending rate was about 3,7 per cent. 
Monetary policy therefore achieved the objective of relative price 
stability. 
 
THE EARLY SIXTIES11 
 
South Africa introduced a new decimal currency system in 1961, 
replacing the previous system comprising pounds, shillings and pennies 
(£/s/d). South Africa introduced a system of rands and cents, with an 
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official conversion rate of £1 = R2. This followed on the report of the 
Decimal Coinage Commission submitted on 1 August 1958 and the 
acceptance of its recommendation of the introduction of a 10-shilling (= 
R1) and cent system, owing to the fact that it would allow easier 
conversion from the previous system. The rand as name for the currency 
comes from Witwatersrand (the White Water Ridge), the shelf of gold in 
the Transvaal on which Johannesburg was established (Wordorigins 
Archive, [S.a.]). 
 
Following political events in Sharpeville on 21 March 1960 (see for 
instance Reeves, [S.a.]), South Africa experienced large outflows of 
foreign capital, mainly in the form of the sale of shares of local 
companies listed on the domestic securities exchange. Such outflows 
could not be covered by the small surplus on the current account of the 
balance of payments. This resulted in an expansion of the exchange 
control measures introduced in terms of the Sterling Area agreement, as 
South Africa left not only the Commonwealth when the country became 
the independent Republic of South Africa on 31 May 1961, but also the 
Sterling Area. Restrictions were placed on foreign investment by 
residents to limit the outflow of capital, accompanied by the introduction 
of the securities rand in terms of which the sales proceeds of domestic 
securities had to be retained in South Africa, and could only be used for 
reinvestment in domestic securities. The securities rand system evolved 
over time into the financial rand system, which became the cornerstone of 
a system of exchange control over non-residents. 
 
This period is also characterised by a unique development at the Bank. 
Currently the SA Reserve Bank Act, No 90 of 1989, as amended, 
stipulates in Section 7 that ‘[t]he Governor shall preside at the meetings 
of the Board … [but] … the Minster … [of Finance] … may designate 
any other director to act as chairman of the Board during the Minister’s 
pleasure’. Similar provision was made in the SA Reserve Bank Act of 
1944 and the Minster of Finance exercised this option in 1962 (Rossouw, 
2004: 1101). During the latter part of 1962 and most of 1963 the 
Governor did not serve as chair of the Board of the Bank, as Dr M H de 
Kock, the previous Governor, was appointed as Chairperson of the Board 
after stepping down from his previous position on 30 June 1962. This 
decision to split the responsibilities was soon found not to be in the best 
interests of the Bank and this practice was ended in 1963 (Rossouw, 
2004: 1102). Complicating factors, for instance, were (i) the question 
whether the Governor or the Chairperson should address the annual 
general meeting of the Bank’s stockholders on monetary policy; and (ii) a 
lack of clarity on the split in decision-making authority between the 
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Chairperson and the Governor. The option of such a split in 
responsibilities is still available to the Minister of Finance, but has since 
not been used. 
 
From March 1958 the minimum overdraft rates of commercial banks 
were retained at a margin of 2 percentage points above Bank rate. As in 
the preceding period, the maintenance of this margin enabled the Bank to 
exert direct influence over the rates of commercial banks. Bank rate 
averaged about 4 per cent, but moved between 3,75 per cent and 5 per 
cent, with a concomitant movement in the minimum overdraft rate, 
averaging at 6 per cent. Inflation was at an average annual rate of about 
1,6 per cent, implying that the average real minimum lending rate was 
about 4,4 per cent. Relative price stability was therefore achieved during 
this period. 
 
DIRECT CONTROLS: 1965 TO 198012 
 
By 1965 the world was still characterised by the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates, with the US dollar as anchor for 
the exchange rate system and convertible into gold at a fixed price of 
US$35/oz. The exchange rates of various countries could be adjusted in 
terms of the Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates 
by means of devaluations or revaluations (Mohr and Fourie, 2004: 436). 
However, this ‘… system came under immense pressure during the late 
1960s and eventually broke down in 1971, when the major industrialised 
countries switched to a system of floating currencies …’ (Mohr and 
Fourie, 2004: 436). The main problem was that the US dollar could not 
be devalued against other currencies, while no pressure for revaluation 
could be imposed on other countries. Following the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system, the Bank had to establish a new exchange rate 
framework for the country. The authorities pegged the exchange rate, 
albeit at varying levels after formal devaluations in December 1971 and 
in September 1975, initially to UK pound sterling, then to the US dollar, 
then a peg to a basket of currencies, and again to the US dollar before a 
system of managed floating was introduced from January 1979.  
 
The Bank introduced the use of credit controls, credit ceilings and deposit 
rate control to limit credit demand (SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 66). As 
inflationary pressures continued to increase, further initiatives were 
introduced in July and August 1966 to curb inflation. These additional 
initiatives included, inter alia, fiscal measures aimed at curbing demand, 
the relaxation of import control and an increase in Bank rate to 6 per cent 
(SA Reserve Bank, 1971: 67). This system of direct controls in South 
14  ANALYSIS OF INFLATION FROM A CENTRAL BANKING PERSPECTIVE 
Africa was supported by a comprehensive system of exchange control 
(SA Reserve Bank, 2005a) which allowed foreign investments by South 
African residents only in exceptional circumstances.  
 
Interest rates were adjusted on a number of occasions, but owing to the 
extensive use of direct controls, rates were not at the market clearing 
level, i.e. where the demand for loanable funds were in equilibrium with 
the supply of such funds. Owing to the use of direct controls the demand 
for loanable funds was artificially contained and interest rates accordingly 
did not reflect the market equilibrium position. 
 
Direct controls and the general approach to monetary policy, including 
adjustments to Bank rate, did not achieve the desired outcome: low 
inflation as measured by changes in the CPI. Inflation accelerated 
between 1965 and 1980: ‘[i]nflation established itself firmly between the 
levels of 10 and 20 percent, and the natural development of financial 
markets was suppressed by the need for direct controls over banks and 
other financial institutions’ (Stals, 1996). Although 1965 to 1980 are 
taken as one period in this analysis owing to the use of direct controls, in 
respect of inflation it should be split into two sub-periods: up to 1973, 
when inflation was at single digits, and from 1974 to 1980, when South 
Africa suffered sustained double-digit inflation, which continued in the 
1980s.  
 
Between 1965 and 1973 inflation was at an average annual rate of about 
4,6 per cent, but accelerated sharply from 1968 to the end of this sub-
period, implying that the average real minimum lending rate was about 
3,4 per cent. Monetary policy therefore achieved relative price stability 
during this sub-period, but failed to address the acceleration in inflation. 
This is confirmed by the fact that the domestic inflation problem already 
received attention by the mid-sixties. 
 
The Council of the Economic Society of South Africa decided on 1 April 
1966 to arrange a conference on accelerating inflation (Richards, 1967: 
278). The conference was hosted on 24 and 25 August 1967 in 
Johannesburg (Richards, 1967: 278). A debate on the definition to be 
used for the type of inflation suffered by South Africa in the late 1960s is 
recorded in the conference proceedings, as different delegates used 
different definitions (see for instance Du Plessis, 1967: 365; Samuels, 
1967: 341; or Van der Horst, 1967: 323). Hobart Houghton stated that 
‘[t]he main strength of the inflation of our time was that we expected it to 
continue …’ (1967: 292). This view was supported by Samuels, who 
stated that ‘… once the market’s expectations … are broken, the 
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problems of the transition to a non-inflationary era will become 
progressively easier. The eradication of inflationary expectations will not 
be easy’ (1967: 355). Reflecting on this conference some 40 years later, 
the reaction is that the issues remain the same, only the names of the 
conferences considering them change. 
 
The second sub-period (1974 to 1980) deals with inflation accelerating to 
a level above 10 per cent per annum and staying at that level for a 
sustained period – in this case until 1992, as is highlighted below. 
Inflation was at an average annual rate of about 12,1 per cent, but 
continued to accelerate sharply towards the end of this sub-period, while 
the average real minimum lending rate of commercial banks was about 
minus 4,1 per cent. Monetary policy, therefore, did not contain inflation 
during this sub-period, while direct controls resulted in the adoption of 
interest rates obviously too low in comparison to the general rate of 
increase in the price level. 
 
The movement from direct controls to a market-oriented monetary policy 
associated with the appointment of Dr G P C de Kock as Governor with 
effect from 1 January 1981, were announced at the Bank’s sixtieth 
ordinary meeting of stockholders held on Tuesday, 26 August 1980 (De 
Jongh, 1980: 10). 
 
STUBBORNLY HIGH INFLATION: 1981 TO 198513 
 
After the unsatisfactory experience with direct controls since 1965, the 
Bank implemented from 1 September 1980 market-oriented monetary 
economic policy. Casteleijn describes monetary policy in the early 1980s 
as a ‘… mixed system during transition …’ (2001: 5; see also Nel, 1993: 
120). Gidlow (1995: 4) describes this period (and the period 1985 to 
1989) as one of a market-oriented mixture of conservative Keynesian 
demand management and monetarism, with the focus on discretionary 
demand management. Despite further amendments to the conduct of 
monetary policy in South Africa since 1981, the Bank has not departed 
from the principle of market-oriented monetary policy. 
 
The period under review is characterised by three important events. First, 
in terms of the political system of constituencies electing representatives 
to Parliament used in South Africa at the time, the National Party (the 
same party mentioned earlier in this paper) government faced a crucial 
by-election in the Primrose constituency on Thursday, 29 November 
1984. From August 1984, interest rates were at a new record-high level, 
with the prime overdraft rate at 25 per cent (SA Reserwebank, 1985: 26), 
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which resulted in widespread domestic unhappiness about the 
macroeconomic management of the economy and, in particular, the 
conduct of monetary policy. The Bank dropped interest rates ten days 
before the by-election, mentioning as reasons for the decision ‘… the 
cooling-down of the economy and the improvement in the balance of 
payments and the exchange rate of the rand … [and] … a general 
downward movement in short-term rates’ (SA Reserve Bank, 1984: 13 
and 14). The Bank increased rates to their previous levels on 8 January 
1985 (SA Reserve Bank, 1985: 16). 
 
This temporary drop of interest rates subsequently became known as the 
Primrose prime incident, as it was generally regarded as a move to 
alleviate pressure on the ruling party. Already at the time of the drop in 
rates, it was stated that ‘… there is no escaping the fact that … [the] … 
cut in prime interest rates was most likely the opportunity cost of the 
National Party winning the Primrose by-election. Despite Reserve Bank 
Governor Gerhard de Kock’s firm denial, this obvious political 
manoeuvre has all the signs of a quick fix … ‘ (Financial Mail, 1984: 35). 
At the time, this incident placed in serious jeopardy the ability of the 
Bank to conduct autonomous monetary policy. This gave rise to serious 
doubts about the future conduct of monetary policy, owing to uncertainty 
whether statements by the Bank could be taken on face value after this 
incident: evidence therefore of a time inconsistency problem (see for 
instance Barro and Gordon, 1983a; Barro and Gordon, 1983b; or Kydland 
and Prescott, 1977). It also reminds of the existence of a political business 
cycle, i.e. the alignment of policy decisions with election cycles 
(Nordhaus, 1975). 
 
Secondly, South Africa's balance-of-payments situation deteriorated 
progressively during 1985, and capital outflows increased substantially 
after the Rubicon14 speech of Mr P W Botha, the President of the country 
at the time, on 15 August 1985 (see for instance Finweek, 2006: 21). The 
country did not exercise exchange control over non-residents at the time, 
owing to the earlier abolition of the financial rand15. Expectations of 
important announcements changing the South African political 
dispensation, at the time characterised by a system of apartheid, did not 
materialise. The speech was described by the African National 
Conference, at the time the major liberation movement in exile, as ‘… an 
arrogant reaffirmation by P W Botha that the apartheid system will 
continue unchanged … [Botha] … prescribed the same solutions which 
have produced the crisis that is now devouring the lives of our people 
daily. In particular, while falsely and cynically claiming to be a democrat, 
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he scorned the very notion of the right of all South Africans to vote for 
the government of their choice’ (Tambo, 1985).  
 
From an economic perspective, the Rubicon speech was a turning point 
for the worse, as it was seen as an entrenchment of an unacceptable 
political system, rather than a new dawn for South Africa. It resulted not 
only in an outflow of foreign capital from South Africa, but foreign credit 
lines were also withdrawn, with South African borrowers unable to 
refinance their foreign short-term borrowing. On 28 August 1985 the 
temporary closure of the foreign exchange market was announced. On 1 
September 1985 South Africa announced a moratorium on the repayment 
of its foreign debts and the reintroduction of the financial rand, i.e. 
exchange control over residents. This was followed by debt rescheduling 
agreements, with the final tranche of rescheduled debt repaid only on 
15 August 2001, when ‘… the arrangements for the repayment of loans in 
terms of the Debt Standstill Agreements concluded from 1985 onwards, 
were ended. On that date, the final authorisation was issued for the 
repayment of all the outstanding capital on loans in the standstill net. This 
brought to an end an unfortunate part of our history. South Africa has, 
however, meticulously honoured all the capital redemption schedules and 
interest payments on this indebtedness in accordance with the agreements 
made with foreign creditors’ (Mboweni, 2001).  
 
Thirdly, the final report of The Commission of inquiry into the monetary 
system and monetary policy of South Africa (De Kock Commission) was 
published in 1985 (Republic of South Africa, 1985), encompassing a 
comprehensive review of monetary policy and financial institutions in 
South Africa. The Commission recommended far-reaching amendments 
to the conduct of monetary policy, which was adopted and implemented 
from 1986. In view of the Primrose prime incident described above, it is 
noteworthy that the Commission’s assessment of the Bank was that the 
intention of the legislator in establishing the Bank was ‘[t]o ensure the 
Bank’s independence and particularly its freedom from party political 
pressure. In this respect the Commission has found no evidence that the 
intentions of the legislator have not been realised. The Bank jealously 
guards its reputation for objectively formulating and applying monetary 
policy in the interest of the whole community’ (Republic of South Africa, 
1985: 253). Stating this less than one year after the Primrose prime 
incident implies that the commissioners either had selective memory or 
no memory at all. 
 
The Commission made a number of recommendations on the autonomy 
of the Bank, the most noteworthy of which is that ‘[w]hile the Reserve 
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Bank and the Treasury acting tighter as the monetary authorities [own 
emphasis] should jointly share the responsibility for broad monetary 
policy … the Reserve Bank … should primarily be charged with the 
responsibility for maintaining monetary stability and protecting the 
internal and external value of the currency. To perform this task 
effectively, the Bank should be ensured of considerable independence in 
matters of monetary policy – subject to only the constraints of the broad 
policy framework laid down by the Government’ (Republic of South 
Africa, 1985: 253). Two issues in this quotation justify further comment: 
 
• the Commission propagated the notion of the monetary authorities 
with joint responsibility for monetary policy, whereas subsequent 
developments have shown that better policy results are obtained when 
the government (or the Minister of Finance) sets, or sets jointly with 
the central bank, the monetary policy goal, but allows the central bank 
operational independence to achieve the goal; and 
• the Commission recommended that the Bank ‘… should primarily be 
charged with … protecting the internal and external value of the 
currency’ (Republic of South Africa, 1985: 253). When a mission for 
the Bank was formulated for the first time in 1990, it referred to the 
objective of protecting the internal and external value of the rand. This 
objective, albeit in a revised format (protect the value of the currency) 
is also contained in the Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  
 
Owing to the adoption of a market-related monetary policy model, 
domestic interest rates not only changed more frequently, but the 
domestic economy was also characterised by nominal rates at a higher 
level than before. Although these changes should be expected in view of a 
policy focus changing from direct controls to a market approach, such 
movements made financial planning increasingly difficult and uncertain 
for businesses and households, with claims that the Bank kept rates at 
artificially high levels. These claims were refuted from time to time by 
the Bank (see for instance De Kock, 1981: 10). As inflation was at an 
average annual rate of about 14 per cent, monetary policy did not achieve 
the objective of relative price stability. 
 
THE PERIOD 1986 TO 198916 
 
In the 1986 budget speech it was announced that Government had 
accepted the recommendations of the De Kock Commission. One of the 
implications was that the Bank would set specific growth targets for one 
or more of the money supply aggregates (Du Plessis, 1986). The Bank 
adopted low-profile, adjustable money-supply growth targets rather than 
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fixed targets, as the latter would not have allowed discretion in the 
application of monetary policy if not achieved. The target set by March 
1986 was to keep the growth rate of the broadly-defined M3 money 
supply between 16 and 20 per cent between the fourth quarter of 1983 
and the fourth quarter of 1984 (Gidlow, 1995: 25). However, in the first 
year of following a money-supply growth target, the Bank already 
realised that the growth rates of the M3 money supply is subject to large 
swings in the velocity of circulation of money. Whereas the growth in M3 
over the period was 10,1 per cent, its effective growth, i.e. M3 multiplied 
by its velocity, amounted to 18,4 per cent. 
 
This period is characterised by a problem similar in nature (but slightly 
different in application) to the Primrose prime incident, although this 
latter occurrence is not as well known. In 1988 Government accepted the 
Proposed Action Plan for Combating Inflation, prepared by the Economic 
Advisory Council of the State President (Stals, 1989: 10). In terms of this 
action plan, inflation had to be addressed with a broad spectrum of 
measures, including restraint in respect of government expenditure. The 
implicit understanding was that all important prices in the economy and 
wages should be retained at current levels – in effect therefore a low-key 
control approach. The wage focus naturally included salaries and wages 
of civil servants, and the focus on important prices not to be increased 
also encompassed the level of interest rates. 
 
Gidlow mentions that the discretionary policy followed at the time by the 
Bank ‘… kan op die mees doeltreffende wyse toegepas word in ‘n milieu 
waar die sentrale bank volkome onafhanklik is. Dit was in 1988 
byvoorbeeld nie die geval nie toe die owerhede moeilikheid ondervind 
het om rentekoerse hoër op te stoot op ‘n tydstip toe die 
betalingsbalansposisie en inflasionistiese druk versleg het’ [… can be 
applied most effectively if the central bank has complete autonomy. This 
was for instance not the case in 1988 when the authorities experienced 
difficulty in increasing interest rates at a time when the balance-of-
payments position deteriorated and inflationary pressures increased17] 
(Gidlow, 1995: 9).  
 
As inflation was at an average annual rate of about 15,6 per cent, 
monetary policy did not achieve the objective of relative price stability 
between 1986 and 1989. The final pronouncement on the period 1985 to 
1989 indeed comes in the form of a statement in the Governor’s Address 
of 1989, i.e. ‘[d]uring the period 1985 – 1987 … [i]nflation was … not 
regarded as South Africa’s main economic problem’ (Stals, 1989: 9). 
 
20  ANALYSIS OF INFLATION FROM A CENTRAL BANKING PERSPECTIVE 
A NEW BEGINNING: 1990 TO 199918 
 
The tone for monetary policy in the 1990s was actually set by the 
Governor on Tuesday, 29 August 1989. Dr C L Stals was appointed 
Governor of the Bank on 8 August 1989, after the previous Governor 
passed away on 7 August 1989. The Bank’s sixty-ninth ordinary general 
meeting of shareholders was held on 29 August 1989. This meeting was 
the first ever referred to as a meeting of shareholders of the Bank. Use of 
this term was brought about by the adoption of the SA Reserve Bank Act 
of 1989, as Sections 1 and 14 of the SA Reserve Bank Act of 1944, as 
well as the regulations framed under Section 23 of that Act, referred to 
stockholders of the Bank, and it had ordinary general meetings of 
stockholders, rather than shareholders, until 1988. The revised Act (which 
is still in place at the time of completion of this paper) makes reference to 
shareholders. 
 
The Governor announced a renewed initiative to contain inflation, which 
remained stubbornly high during the 1980s. It was explained that ‘[a]t a 
time when most of the industrial countries of the world pursued strong 
anti-inflationary policies, South Africa was pre-occupied with short-term 
economic problems … [and] … [i]nflation was at that stage not regarded 
as South Africa’s main economic problem … [but] … the main emphasis 
of monetary policy has … [now] … been switched to the curtailment of 
inflation … In the circumstances it can no longer be regarded as 
appropriate to continue to accommodate price increases through large 
increases in Bank credit and in the monetary policy’ (Stals, 1989: 10). 
The view was that ‘[t]hrough a disciplined monetary and fiscal policy 
approach … it will be possible to reduce the rate of inflation in South 
Africa over the next few years’ (Stals, 1989: 10). Padayachee (2001: 753) 
states that the Bank had no real autonomy before 1989. The Bank 
managed to regain its autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy after 
1989. 
 
The renewed focus on containing inflation resulted in a typical time 
inconsistency problem in South Africa (see for instance Barro and 
Gordon, 1983a; Barro and Gordon, 1983b; or Kydland and Prescott, 
1977). Given a period of double-digit inflation that commenced in 1974 
and numerous previous announcements of intentions to contain inflation 
in the ensuing period that was not implemented successfully, it is no 
wonder that the announcement of 1989 was not believed. The result was 
three years of stagflation until 1992, characterised by double digit 
inflation and negative economic growth rates. By 1993 the policy started 
bearing fruit, with a general declining trend in inflation since that date. 
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Owing to factors such as international financial integration, growth in the 
money supply lost its usefulness domestically and internationally as an 
anchor for money policy by the early 1990s (Casteleijn 2001: 6; see also 
Rossouw, 2005). It was time for a new approach. South Africa replaced 
money supply growth targets with money supply growth guidelines in the 
early 1990s, which was replaced, in turn, by eclectic monetary policy in 
1996 (Van der Merwe, 1997: 2). 
 
On 13 March 1998 the Bank replaced Bank rate as its refinancing rate for 
banks with a repurchase (repo) rate (Van der Merwe, 1997: 2 and 3), the 
rate still in use. A variable repo rate was initially adopted, as it permitted 
leeway for the Bank to signal its intentions to the market. When South 
Africa developed liquidity problems during May 1998, following similar 
problems in other emerging-market economies, it became obvious that 
the variable repo rate did not respond with enough flexibility to the 
changed circumstances. The Bank accordingly fixed the repo rate for a 
limited period of time. Fixing was subsequently abandoned in favour of a 
variable repo rate, but in an attempt to prevent nervousness over the 
millennium change-over period, the Bank again fixed the repo rate late in 
1999. As this approach has delivered the desired results since then, the 
policy of fixing the repo rate has been retained.  
 
Without abandoning eclectic monetary policy, the Bank decided in March 
1998 that it would strive to align domestic inflation with the rates of 
inflation in South Africa’s major trading-partner countries, implying an 
informal inflation goal of 1 to 5 per cent (Casteleijn, 2001: 6). The main 
disadvantage of this approach was ‘… that it could not be expected to 
elicit the same commitment to policy co-ordination that would follow if 
the government had formally endorsed or set the target’ (Casteleijn, 2001: 
6). Khabo states that ‘… while Chris Stals was successful in fighting 
inflation, he was accused of lack of transparency’ (2002: 151).  
 
Since 1990 the autonomy of the central bank was also restored, as 
problems such as the Primrose prime incident were not repeated. The 
Bank did not adjust interest rates at the time of the first democratic 
elections in April 1994 or at the time of subsequent general elections. 
After the elections in 1994 South Africa embarked on a policy of gradual 
abolition of exchange control. In as much as sound monetary policy is 
pursued, exchange control is no longer required to protect the economy 
against the negative consequences of bad policy. With the abolition of the 
financial rand in 1995 practically all exchange control arrangements in 
respect of non-residents were abolished. This was subsequently followed 
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by the relaxation of exchange control for residents and domestic juristic 
persons. One such step was the announcement of an amnesty for residents 
(other than juristic persons) who had previously contravened exchange 
control. 
 
The Minister of Finance announced an exchange control and related tax 
amnesty on 26 February 2003 (Manual, 2003). In response to the 
amnesty, nearly 43 000 South African residents submitted amnesty 
applications, disclosing illegal foreign assets amounting to R 45,0 billion. 
South Africa’s mid-year population estimate in 2004 was 46,6 million 
people, implying that nearly 1 out of every 1 000 South Africans had 
illegal assets abroad, despite the application of strict exchange control 
restrictions over residents since 1961. In addition, South Africa’s legal 
foreign assets as at 31 December 2002 were underreported by some 7 per 
cent if these illegal assets are taken into consideration (Rossouw, 2008). 
This experience shows that South Africa’s exchange control measures can 
hardly be regarded as a resounding success. 
 
The gradual abolition of exchange control is not universally supported. 
As a case in point is Epstein (2002), who argues for the stricter 
enforcement of the system of exchange control, rather than any gradual 
relaxation. Epstein (2002) also favours the introduction of other measures 
to insulate the domestic economy from global pressures, e.g. the 
introduction of transaction taxes on international transactions. The best-
known of such proposals is a Tobin tax, i.e. the introduction of a small 
tax on capital transactions in foreign currencies, aimed at reducing the 
attractiveness of such transactions for speculative purposes. Epstein 
(2002) states that a policy of increased international isolation will allow 
the central bank the freedom to focus on the important goal of domestic 
employment creation. 
 
Average annual inflation was about 9,9 per cent during the period 1990 to 
1999, while the prime overdraft rates of banks were retained at a level of 
3,5 percentage points, initially above Bank rate and subsequently above 
the repo rate. The average annual real prime rate was at a level of 8,3 per 
cent. As inflation started off at a level of 14,4 per cent per annum, the 
trend in inflation rather than its average level, is a better indication of the 
success of monetary policy over this period. Based on this criterion, 
monetary policy achieved its goal of a new beginning, as inflation ended 
the period at an annual rate of 5,2 per cent, a level not seen since 1967 
when annual inflation was 5,7 per cent. This experience shows that 
persistent strict monetary policy over a prolonged period is required to 
contain sustained high inflation once it has become entrenched in an 
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economy. No painless policy options are available to force the rate of 
inflation to a structurally lower level. 
 
INFLATION TARGETING: MONETARY POLICY SINCE 2000 
 
On 23 February 2000, the Minster of Finance announced the adoption of 
inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework for South Africa (see 
South Africa, 2000 in this regard). This announcement confirmed the 
adoption of a rules-based monetary policy framework, thereby limiting 
the scope for time inconsistency problems in the implementation of 
monetary policy. The South African government is responsible for setting 
and adjusting the target. The target is specified in terms of changes in 
CPIX, which has the somewhat cumbersome specification of changes in 
the CPI for metropolitan and other urban areas excluding changes in the 
interest costs of mortgage bonds (Mboweni, 2005b; see also Van der 
Merwe, 2004). At the time of the announcement of the target, it was set 
for achievement for the first time by 2002, as changes in interest rates in 
South Africa generally take from 18 to 24 months to influence the 
underlying rate of inflation.  
 
The specification of CPIX is somewhat problematic. The main difference 
between CPI and CPIX is the exclusion of changes in the interest cost of 
mortgage bonds, with a weight of 10,32 per cent in the overall CPI 
(Statistics SA, 2001). It is noteworthy that this exclusion is aimed at 
limiting the immediate effect of interest rate changes on the inflation 
figure used for targeting purposes, but that all changes in interest costs are 
not excluded. Changes in interest costs (of loans other than mortgage 
bonds) and bank charges account for a weight of 1,05 per cent in the CPI 
(Statistics SA, 2001), although no clear split is provided. Ideally all 
interest costs should be excluded form the targeted inflation rate. 
Secondly, the use of the word bonds in this specification might be 
somewhat confusing in certain English-speaking countries, as a bond can 
also be defined as ‘… a certificate issued by a government or a public 
company promising to repay borrowed money at a fixed rate of interest at 
a specified time’ (Soanes and Stevenson, 2004: 157). Lastly, CPIX does 
not cover rural areas. An alternative for South Africa could be to specify 
the target simply as changes in the CPI excluding interest costs to 
overcome these difficulties. 
 
In its specification of the target, the South African government selected a 
target range rather than a specific point. Setting a specific point as a target 
‘… is clear and straightforward and focuses attention, expectations and 
policy actions on a single numerical value … [but] … implies a degree of 
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precision which cannot realistically be expected of monetary policy, 
especially in a small, open economy’ (Casteleijn, 2001: 8). Under the 
circumstances the announcement of a target range was more appropriate 
for South Africa, as it improved the probability of achievement by the 
central bank: an important precondition for the announcement of a 
credible inflation target. If the target is specified as a specific point, the 
central bank is expected to change course whenever the rate is not on 
target, despite expectations of movements in the rate in the near future. 
Of the 23 countries identified by the International Monetary Fund as 
inflation targeters by 2006 (Allen et al., 2006: 5), three used a single 
target point with no range, while eleven countries used a single target 
point with a range around the single point. The remaining nine countries 
use a target range. A narrow specification of the rate of inflation used for 
targeting purposes will increase the likelihood of achieving a specific 
target point, while a broad specification as is used in South Africa 
dictates the use of a target range, as many price changes can influence the 
rate of inflation. 
 
In 2001 the Minister of Finance announced that ‘[t]he inflation target will 
remain an annual average increase of between 3 and 6 per cent in CPIX in 
2003. For the 2004 and 2005 year, the target will be 3 to 5 per cent’ 
(Manuel, 2001: 6). In view of subsequent negative developments, the 
Minister announced in 2002 that ‘… Governor Mboweni and I have 
agreed that the inflation target should remain 3 to 6 per cent for 2004. The 
3 to 5 per cent target falls away until further notice’ (Manuel, 2002: 4). 
While the Bank initially set the goal of maintaining CPIX on an annual 
average basis, the Minster announced in 2003 that the inflation target 
would in future be regarded as a continuous target to be achieved on a 
monthly basis (Manuel, 2003: 6). The target range of 3 to 6 per cent was 
still in use at the time of the completion of this paper, although actual 
CPIX was well in excess of the target, with a rate of 8,8 per cent recorded 
for January 2008. 
 
Currently the policy of inflation targeting serves South Africa’s best 
interests. Since the adoption of an inflation target the minimum overdraft 
rates of commercial banks were retained at a margin of 3,5 percentage 
points above the repo rate, which enables the Bank to exert a direct 
influence over the rates charged by commercial banks. The real repo rate 
averaged about 4,7 per cent between 2000 and 2007, and inflation 
measured in terms of changes in the CPI was at an average annual rate of 
about 5,4 per cent, implying that the average nominal minimum lending 
rate was about 13,6 per cent. Monetary policy achieved the overarching 
objective of relative price stability, confirmed by the fact that CPIX 
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remained within the target range of 3 to 6 per cent between September 
2003 and April 2007. As was the case in the 1990s, the Bank retained its 
autonomy in the implementation of monetary policy after the adoption of 
an inflation-targeting monetary policy.  
 
Despite the transparency of an inflation-targeting policy and the central 
bank’s best efforts to improve communication as is explained below, the 
general public, journalists and market watchers nevertheless remain 
susceptible to misinterpretation of policy actions of the Bank. A case in 
point is the decrease in the repo rate announced by the Bank in April 
2005. Some commentators interpreted this as the Bank changing its 
objective from inflation targeting to an exchange rate target or anchor of 
some or another sort. The Governor, however, explained later that ‘… 
changes in the exchange rate are important in the inflation process in 
South Africa. The stronger rand (at the time of the announcement in April 
2005) was expected to have a direct impact on inflation through the price 
of imports. At the same time, there is an indirect effect through the 
negative impact of the strong exchange rate on the export and import-
competing sectors of the economy. This resultant widening in the gap 
between actual and potential output would also have a moderating effect 
on the inflation outlook. The reduction in the repurchase rate was, 
therefore, not a result of a focus on the strong rand, but of the favourable 
inflation outlook’ (Mboweni, 2005a: 6). As the Bank does not have goal 
independence and the Government entrusted the achievement of the 
inflation target to the Bank, it cannot be changed unilaterally by the Bank. 
It can only be changed by the South African Government by means of 
public announcement. Given the misinterpretation in April 2005, it is fair 
to conclude that the Bank faces a formidable communication challenge, 
as is explained in the next section. 
 
IMPROVED COMMUNICATION BY THE BANK19 
 
The adoption of an inflation target as a nominal anchor for South African 
monetary policy should have removed any time inconsistency problems 
in the conduct of monetary policy, as the general public, journalists and 
market watchers should trust announcements by the Bank that it remains 
committed to low inflation. Trust, credibility and confidence are 
enhanced by central bank communication (see for instance Mishkin, 
2004: 501). As inflation targeting states clearly the central bank's 
intentions, ‘… the public is able to understand and monitor central bank 
actions. This improves the transparency of monetary policy, making 
communication with the public more effective, while providing increased 
discipline and accountability for central bank activities’ (Aninat, 2000). 
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The Bank has introduced a number of initiatives to improve 
communication with all its stakeholders since the introduction of an 
inflation targeting policy framework in 2000. Wessels observes that ‘… 
the introduction of a numerical inflation target increased the transparency 
of the Bank’s policy objectives substantially, and contributed to the 
public’s understanding of what the Bank is explicitly held accountable 
for’ (2002: 978). The Governor pointed out in 2002 that ‘[i]nflation 
targeting has also been accompanied by major improvements in the 
Bank's communication with the public and markets and there has been a 
significant upgrade in monetary policy transparency’ (Mboweni, 2002). 
In the case of the Bank, the most important stakeholders are (in 
alphabetical order) government, labour, media, Parliament, public, and 
shareholders and staff members of the Bank. 
 
The most important initiative to improve communication about the 
formulation of monetary policy was to entrust interest rate decisions to a 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) with responsibility for setting the 
repo rate (see for instance Mboweni, 1999; or SA Reserve Bank, 1999). 
The MPC introduced certainty about responsibility for setting the repo 
rate. As its meeting dates are published well in advance, any element of 
surprise about the timing of monetary policy decisions (although not 
about the decision itself) is removed. The MPC releases a detailed 
statement highlighting its assessment of economic conditions that led to 
its interest rate decision after each meeting and the decision is explained 
after each meeting at a media conference. 
 
Further initiatives to improve monetary policy transparency and 
communication are ‘… the biannual Monetary Policy Review … and the 
national and regional Monetary Policy Forums’ (Mboweni, 2002). The 
first Monetary Policy Review (the Review) of the Bank was published in 
March 2001, as ‘… part of the Reserve Bank’s attempt to broaden the 
understanding of the aims and conduct of monetary policy’ (SA Reserve 
Bank, 2005b). The Review analyses developments in and factors 
influencing inflation, assesses recent policy developments and considers 
the outlook for inflation (see for instance SA Reserve Bank, 2005b). The 
Review reports on the MPC’s assessment of inflation and the Bank’s 
inflation forecast, hence providing an ex post insight into matters 
deliberated by the MPC. 
  
The first meeting of a Monetary Policy Forum was held in Pretoria on 20 
March 2000 (SA Reserve Bank, 2000). Currently the Bank hosts Forums 
biannually in Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, East London, 
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Kimberley, Mafikeng, Polokwane, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria and Nelspruit. 
These forums provide for discussions on monetary policy over a broad 
geographical spectrum involving a large cross-section of stakeholders, 
including trade union representatives, analysts, academics and the media. 
 
The Bank published Annual Financial Statements until 2002, but 
reporting and disclosure in the statements increased and improved to the 
extent that its name was changed to Annual Report and Financial 
Statements in 2003 and to Annual Report in 2006. The revised name 
reflects its nature: in the interest of improved communication, the Bank 
reports on matters much broader than only its financial affairs. Owing to 
its approval by shareholders and its tabling in Parliament, the Annual 
Report attracts considerable media attention, enhancing the accuracy of 
reporting on the Bank. The release of the Annual Report is supported by 
the publication of the Governor’s Address to shareholders after the annual 
general meeting. Currently the Governor’s Address is published in six 
official languages in a variety of newspapers and magazines, so as to 
broaden its reach and make it more accessible to the public.  
 
During 2004 the Bank introduced shareholder briefings. The management 
of the Bank identified the importance of briefing this group of 
stakeholders on occasions other than at annual ordinary general meetings. 
Shareholders are invited to these biennial briefings, which are hosted in 
three or four major cities in South Africa.  
 
The Bank is ultimately accountable to Parliament as the representative 
body of all the people in South Africa, and submits its Annual Report to 
Parliament. The Governor meets periodically with members of the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Finance. In addition, during March 
2007 the Board of Directors of the Bank (as represented by its 
Remuneration Committee chaired by a non-executive director) met with 
this same Parliamentary Committee to enhance accountability (Ensor, 
2007: 2). 
 
Apart from the formal external communication approaches, the Bank also 
employs a number of other communication channels. These include 
briefing sessions with media representatives and speeches by the 
Governor, deputy governors and other senior officials. In addition, the 
Bank’s website is used extensively to alert the media and staff to 
important announcements by the Bank (www.reservebank.co.za). 
 
The Bank has also introduced steps to improve communication with its 
current and retired employees since 2000. An annual general management 
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conference, comprising the Governor, the deputy governors, all staff at 
the level of assistant general manager and above, and branch managers, 
was introduced by the Bank in 2004. The staff magazine, Bankindaba, 
was revised to ensure better communication with current and former 
employees. 
 
Judging form these initiatives, it is obvious that the Bank values the 
importance of communication supporting a policy of inflation targeting, 
despite the lack of international benchmarks for successful central bank 
communication (see for instance Blinder, [S.a.]; or Ehrmann and 
Fratzcher, 2004). 
 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA’S EXPERIENCE 
WITH INFLATION 
 
The central finding of this paper is that the problem of inflation in South 
Africa has occurred in different forms and has occupied the attention of 
monetary authorities over many years. Inappropriate economic policy, 
and monetary policy in particular, contributed to conditions conducive for 
the development of inflationary conditions. In containing inflation there is 
no single solution that could be applied universally, except to state the 
obvious: countries (including emerging economies) should prevent 
unsound policies that will foster inflation. 
 
Since the establishment of the Bank in 1921, South Africa has 
experienced varying degrees of success in containing or combating 
inflation. In the period before World War II, the Bank achieved 
remarkable success in containing inflation, although inappropriate 
policies were followed on occasion, albeit with the support of the 
Government or even in support of the policy stance of the Government. 
During and immediately after World War II the Bank was less successful 
in containing inflation, but regained monetary control by the late 1950s 
and the 1960s. 
 
From 1968 domestic inflation started accelerating, and in the ensuing 
years the SA Reserve Bank seemed incapable of controlling it effectively. 
Reviewing the 20-year period from 1974 to 1993, however, reveals that 
the Bank was one of very view central banks in the world that managed to 
contain inflation between 10 per cent and 20 per cent per annum, without 
it developing into runaway inflation, as is evidenced by Table 1. This 
shows clearly that emerging economies suffering high inflation have no 
painless or costless options to contain inflation. 
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Table 1 Average inflation rates in developed and selected emerging 
economies, 1961 – 1970 to 1991 – 2000 
 
 1961–1970 1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
Developed 
economies 
4,0 10,8 8,1 3,0 
Selected 
emerging 
economies* 
18,3 29,8 139,7 58,9 
South Africa 2,8 10,6 15,4 9,0 
* Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Phillippines, 
Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela 
 
Sources: Adapted from Mokoena et al., 2004; authors’ addition of South Africa 
 
An ex post analysis gives the impression that the Bank followed an 
inflation target of between 10 and 15 per cent per annum, with monetary 
tightening whenever inflation breached 15 per cent, and monetary 
relaxation whenever inflation declined to levels slightly above 10 per 
cent. This was indeed not due to the policy approach, but the result of 
inconsistent policy application. It nevertheless confirms that the Bank all 
along had the tools and knowledge to contain inflation, but lacked the 
autonomy during this period to follow consistently policies aimed at 
achieving this goal. It also shows that policies should be revised when 
they no longer achieve the goal of low inflation. This is an important 
conclusion for emerging economies, as such countries could, at times, be 
more constrained in their monetary policy options than developed 
countries. 
 
A comprehensive system of exchange controls is a precondition for 
inappropriate monetary policy causing sustained high domestic inflation. 
Without such controls domestic investors revert to foreign investments 
with a concomitant demand for foreign currency, leaving the central bank 
no choice but to adapt sound monetary policy to lower inflation to a level 
commensurable with the levels of inflation in industrialised countries. 
Emerging economies exercising exchange control should assess whether 
such a policy approach is a shield for inappropriate monetary policy. If 
this is indeed the case, a consequence will be the temptation to use such 
protection for sustained unsound monetary policy. 
 
A function of lender of last resort was explicitly entrusted to the Bank 
after the establishment of the NFC. This function merely entails normal 
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central banking discounting to qualifying institutions when other sources 
of liquidity are not readily available. It seems that the use of this 
terminology has changed over time and currently describes the provision 
of liquidity to a bank (or the banking system) when no other options are 
available, with the aim of preventing bank and/or financial panics. A 
clarification of the lender-of-last-resort assistance function is therefore 
necessary. The terminology emergency liquidity assistance might be a 
more appropriate description of the current general understanding of the 
responsibility of central banks under conditions of distress lending. Such 
a description will also indicate clearly that this assistance is available only 
to banks suffering liquidity problems, and not to banks suffering solvency 
problems. 
 
Since the 1990s the Bank has again been successful in containing 
inflation, albeit with the use of different policy models. Its current use of 
rules-based monetary policy and inflation targeting places South Africa 
squarely in the realm of orthodox policy and the Washington Consensus. 
The emergence of a Post-Washington Consensus (see for instance 
Padayachee, 2001: 746) gives rise to the question whether the Bank will 
retain an inflation targeting monetary policy framework. However, the 
framework cannot be revised by the central bank, as it was entrusted to 
the Bank by the South African government. Any policy amendment 
should accordingly also be announced by the government. Emerging 
economies considering the adoption of rules-based monetary policy 
should ensure a similar split in responsibilities. 
 
While the current monetary policy model is retained, the South African 
authorities should reconsider the somewhat cumbersome specification of 
the inflation rate used for targeting purposes. In the interest of easier 
communication and the further clarification of the policy aim, an 
alternative for South Africa could be to specify the target simply as 
changes in the CPI excluding interest costs. Emerging economies 
considering the adoption of an inflation-targeting monetary policy regime 
should keep these considerations in mind when specifying their inflation 
rates for targeting purposes. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. SA Reserve Bank and Department of Economics, University of 
Pretoria.  
 
2. School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
This paper draws on research used in the completion of the PhD-
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thesis of Jannie Rossouw under the supervision of Prof Vishnu 
Padayachee at the School of Development Studies at the University 
of KwaZulu-Natal (see Rossouw, 2008).  The views and opinions 
expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views and 
opinions of the SA Reserve Bank or any of the Universities. 
 
3. Tables A1 and B1 in Appendices A and B highlight South Africa’s 
experience with inflation, as measured by changes in the CPI since 
1921. 
 
4. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on De Kock, 
1954. 
 
5. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on SA Reserve 
Bank, 1971. 
 
6. The Treasury (as it was known at the time) and the SA Reserve 
Bank. 
 
7. Although this historic overview confirms an implicit or explicit 
focus on inflation in the conduct of central banking since the 
1930s, the SA Reserve Bank’s enabling legislation was changed 
only in 1989 to make provision for this objective.  From the 
literature, however, it transpires that the SA Reserve Bank focused 
attention on mitigating inflation well before 1989 (see for instance 
De Kock, 1954; De Kock, 1956; or SA Reserve Bank, 1971). 
 
8. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on SA Reserve 
Bank, 1971. 
 
9. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on De Kock, 
1954. 
 
10. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on SA Reserve 
Bank, 1971. 
 
11. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on SA Reserve 
Bank, 1971. 
 
12. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on Republic of 
South Africa, 1985. 
 
13. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on Stals, 1996. 
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14. Reference was made to the proverbial crossing of the Rubicon in 
the speech (the name by which it subsequently became known); a 
reference to Julius Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon river in 49 BC.  
The phrase crossing the Rubicon has survived to refer to any 
person committing irrevocably to a risky course of action 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2005). 
 
15. The financial rand, which replaced the securities rand as the main 
measure of exchange control over non-residents, was abolished in 
February 1983, and with it exchange control over non-residents 
(Republic of South Africa, 1985: 131). 
 
16. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on Stals, 1996. 
 
17. Authors’ translation. 
 
18. Except where stated otherwise, this section draws on Van der 
Merwe, 1999. 
 
19. This section is based on a conference paper presented in Nicosia in 
March 2007 (Rossouw, 2007). 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1 South African annual inflation rate measured as changes in CPI, 1921 to 
2007 
1921 -9,5 1944 3,5 1967 3,5 1990 14,4 
1922 -16,6 1945 2,7 1968 1,8 1991 15,3 
1923 -3,0 1946 1,5 1969 2,9 1992 13,9 
1924 1,4 1947 4,0 1970 4,1 1993 9,7 
1925 -0,4 1948 5,6 1971 5,7 1994 9,0 
1926 -1,5 1949 3,7 1972 6,1 1995 8,7 
1927 0,6 1950 4,0 1973 9,4 1996 7,4 
1928 0,0 1951 7,4 1974 11,6 1997 8,6 
1929 -0,3 1952 8,7 1975 12,5 1998 6,9 
1930 -2,3 1953 3,4 1976 11,2 1999 5,2 
1931 -3,8 1954 1,6 1977 11,2 2000 5,4 
1932 -4,5 1955 3,2 1978 11,0 2001 5,7 
1933 -2,7 1956 1,9 1979 13,2 2002 9,2 
1934 1,2 1957 3,0 1980 13,8 2003 5,8 
1935 -0,6 1958 3,5 1981 15,2 2004 1,4 
1936 0,3 1959 1,1 1982 14,7 2005 3,4 
1937 2,4 1960 1,2 1983 12,4 2006 4,7 
1938 3,6 1961 2,2 1984 11,5 2007 7,1 
1939 0,0 1962 1,3 1985 16,3   
1940 3,3 1963 1,4 1986 18,6   
1941 4,6 1964 2,6 1987 16,1   
1942 8,4 1965 3,9 1988 12,9   
1943 6,0 1966 3,6 1989 14,7   
 
Sources: Statistics SA, [S.a.] 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1 South African CPI, 1922 = 100 
1921 110,5 1944 117,1 1967 244,5 1990 2876,4 
1922 100,0 1945 120,1 1968 249,4 1991 3317,5 
1923 97,0 1946 121,9 1969 257,5 1992 3777,8 
1924 98,4 1947 126,9 1970 268,0 1993 4144,9 
1925 98,0 1948 134,2 1971 283,2 1994 4515,4 
1926 96,5 1949 139,2 1972 301,6 1995 4907,4 
1927 97,0 1950 144,7 1973 330,5 1996 5268,3 
1928 97,2 1951 155,4 1974 368,8 1997 5721,2 
1929 96,8 1952 168,9 1975 415,1 1998 6114,9 
1930 94,6 1953 174,8 1976 460,9 1999 6431,7 
1931 91,1 1954 178,0 1977 512,3 2000 6775,1 
1932 87,0 1955 183,6 1978 569,3 2001 7161,4 
1933 84,7 1956 187,1 1979 645,0 2002 7817,7 
1934 85,9 1957 192,7 1980 733,1 2003 8275,7 
1935 85,4 1958 199,4 1981 844,9 2004 8390,4 
1936 85,6 1959 201,7 1982 968,6 2005 8675,7 
1937 87,7 1960 204,1 1983 1087,8 2006 9083,5 
1938 90,9 1961 208,5 1984 1213,1 2007 9728,4 
1939 90,8 1962 211,2 1985 1410,8   
1940 94,0 1963 213,9 1986 1674,0   
1941 98,3 1964 219,4 1987 1944,5   
1942 106,5 1965 228,1 1988 2193,0   
1943 113,0 1966 236,3 1989 2516,1   
 
Sources: Statistics SA, [S.a.] 
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